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Managing Public Investment Funds:
Best Practices and New Questions
Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott, and Cagri Kumru

Governments everywhere are amassing large pools of resources held by and managed for the
public sector. The media calls these asset pools variously “future funds,” “sovereign wealth funds,”
and “government investment funds,” and these entities afford their sponsoring nations both
opportunities and risks depending on how these national endowments are managed. As these
publicly-held wealth funds grow, they are assuming an increasingly prominent role in news-making
international investments, including providing support to some of the world’s most important and
often-troubled financial institutions (Scheherazade and Blitz 2007). Analysts regularly comment on
the size and potential international clout of these financial behemoths (Morgan Stanley Global
2007), and some of the investment choices made by these funds have prompted policymakers
including the governments of France and Germany to worry publicly about the potential economic
impact of these funds’ global reach (Economist 2008). In parallel, international agencies including
the OECD and the International Monetary Fund have begun to ask questions publicly about what
these funds are and how they should be managed.1
Our paper analyzes new information about ‘best practice’ management techniques for such
publicly-managed investment pools, focusing particularly on governance and reporting patterns
along with how one might seek to protect the assets from political interference. We do so to glean
lessons on which governance and accountability approaches appear to be well suited in the case of
these publicly-held wealth funds, and we also draw out policy inferences regarding governance
reform. We show that these publicly-managed investment funds have many different historical
roots, including a purposeful buildup of fiscal surplus against future economic shocks (e.g.
1

See also Musalem and Palacios (2004).
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Australia, New Zealand); a focused effort to mitigate the effects of demographic disequilibrium on
the social security balance (e.g., Japan); or a desire to set aside some portion of revenue associated
with the exploitation of natural resources (e.g. Norway). In value terms, the Japanese public
pension reserve is among the largest, with some US$912 billion in accumulated funds (Matsui and
Suzuki 2007). Other large funds include that of the United Arab Emirates (US$875B), Singapore’s
GIC fund ($330B), and Norway’s Pension Fund (US$300B); see the Economist (2007).
In what follows, we take up several questions of key importance to public investment funds.
First, we ask what constitutes “good management practice,” by which we mean the protocols and
practices regarding fund governance, accountability, and investment policies (below we outline
what we mean by each of these). Second, we ask how good management of public investment funds
affects fund performance. In order to do so, it is necessary to evaluate what types of performance
metrics exist and whether they might depend on the type of fund. We also review the literature
regarding the effect of management practice on performance of public investment funds. Third, we
explore whether good management practices for public investment funds for governance,
accountability, and investment policies appears to be linked to key aspects of a nation’s economic,
political, and social conditions. In particular, we evaluate the association between a nation’s
publicly-run asset pools and its management practices, economic environment, political/legal
structure, and practice regarding transparency/ reporting/accountability. We also evaluate whether
the size of future calls on resources, measured here by the aged dependency ratio, influences
management practices. As nations become aware of promises made in the form of aged-care
benefits, and as financial market upheaval provides these public investment pools with new
opportunities and challenges, this will surely prompt stronger calls for better public fund investment
performance.
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The Nature and Variety of Public Investment Pools
In this paper we refer to public investment funds as those investible assets under the control
of the public sector. In practice, these take three main forms: foreign exchange reserve funds held
for stabilization purposes; sovereign wealth funds accumulated from natural resource taxes or fiscal
surpluses; and public pension funds built up either through an explicit funded arrangement or the
result of an excess of contributions over benefits during a demographic transition.
From the perspective of investment discretion, we place currency stabilization funds at one
end of the spectrum. These assets must be liquid and are usually held in the form of short term
paper or commodities. Moving along the spectrum, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are government
investment vehicles that manage their assets separately from official foreign exchange reserves. As
a rule, their assets tend to be invested internationally, though sometimes they have been used for
domestic investments (e.g. infrastructure). Some analysts are quite specific in what they refer to as
SWFs: for example, Jen (2007) specifies that the pool must be managed by a government
(sovereign entity); it must have high foreign currency exposure; it must have no explicit liabilities;
it must have high risk tolerance; and it must have a long investment horizon. In what follows, we
take a broader view in encompassing investible publicly managed funds more generally.
A third type of publicly managed money consists of reserves built up for public pension
purposes. Due to their long term nature of their liabilities, these funds are typically less constrained
by the need for immediate liquidity. Nevertheless, also because of their liability profile, the asset
allocations in these funds are often weighted toward domestic currency assets as this is the currency
of the pension promises. In particular, public pension funds are often concentrated in government
bonds as a result of explicit policy or institutional tradition. For instance, the US Social Security
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Trust Fund of almost US$2 trillion is held entirely in special-issue nonnegotiable US government
bonds.
Of the three types of public investment funds, sovereign wealth funds seem to be growing
most rapidly and have been permitted the greatest investment flexibility. Some SWFs were
established to manage the intertemporal allocation of resources generated by the discovery and
exploitation of a non-renewable natural resource, while others were set up to absorb government
fiscal surpluses expected to be spent in the future. One way or another, both pension funds and
SWFs have an inter-temporal or even an intergenerational dimension in their objectives. We explore
the form and function of each, in what follows.
Currency Stabilization Funds. Though currency stabilization funds are not the central focus of the
present paper, it is worth noting that they are the largest of the three categories of public investment
funds. Available estimates place the total at around US$4.5 trillion (see Table 1). These have been
rationalized by perhaps the oldest and most conventional explanation for government-held funds,
namely the central monetary authority’s desire to smooth currency fluctuations. In practice, it is
often stated that three months’ of reserves is a prudent cushion for exchange rate shocks (Rietveld
and Pringle 2007). In point of fact, many nations hold far more than the minimum level of assets
required to manage currency stabilization, giving rise to more aggressive investments via sovereign
wealth funds. For example, in China, Russia, and Singapore, SWFs are responsible for both foreign
exchange reserves and fiscal surpluses. An important stimulus behind the recent growth in SWFs
has been the rising central bank reserves in rapidly growing countries such as South Korea and
Taiwan. Official reserves in such funds have expanded at US$600 billion per year over the past
half-decade (Patelis 2007), and reserves held for currency stabilization are expected to rise in the
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future. Nevertheless, as our present concern is with asset pools held for the long run, we do not
further consider stabilization pools below.
Table 1 here
Sovereign Wealth Funds. Despite substantial media and policymaker interest in SWFs of late,
their precise magnitude is unknown for reasons to be discussed below. One estimate suggests they
hold between US$1.5-$3.1 trillion (Kern 2007; Patelis 2007). Truman (2007a,b) identifies around
two dozen SWFs which he contends control around US$2 trillion in assets; he also separately lists
foreign exchange reserves held by governments totalling about US$4 trillion and he includes
Japan’s approximately US$800 billion pension fund. Conservative estimates from Watson Wyatt
(2006, 2007) suggest that SWFs and public pensions together hold about US$4 trillion. Figure 1
provides a comparison of assets held by both public and private funds, and it indicates that currency
stabilization and pension funds are far larger than SWFs, while SWFs in turn are larger than hedge
funds in the global capital market.
Figure 1 here
Many of the early SWFs were set up in countries holding natural resources (e.g. petroleum)
which then became exposed to unpredictable revenues due to commodity price volatility. As an
example, if a country's oil revenue represented 20 percent of its gross domestic product, then a one
standard deviation shock to oil prices would create a revenue decrease equivalent to six percent of
GDP (Hausmann and Rigobon, cited in Devlin and Titman 2004). Chile’s Economic and Social
Stabilization Fund and the Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund are examples of
stabilization funds designed to offset such commodity price fluctuations. One way that governments
might seek to handle commodity price risk could be to transfer risk to international capital markets
so as to smooth economic performance over the relatively short term (Arrau and Claessens 1992).
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But the thinness of international insurance markets and apparent borrowing constraints are believed
to make self-insurance a more natural choice for oil-producers to protect themselves against such
price volatility. Indeed, self-insurance is recommended by Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) who contend
that the benefits from public expenditures on lumpy investments when oil prices are high exceed the
costs of shutting them down when oil prices are low. Commodity-exporting countries may selfinsure against volatile commodity prices either by diversifying their export structure or
accumulating financial assets. Since diversifying export structure requires long-term structural
reform and may reduce comparative advantage, financial asset accumulation can be a better choice
given available alternatives.2
There is some controversy about the economic rationale for such stabilization funds. For
instance Davis et al. (2001) find that fiscal stabilization funds may be less efficient than sound fiscal
policy in protecting against commodity price volatility. On the other hand, Shabsigh and Ilahi
(2007) analyze the effects of stabilization funds not only in terms of fiscal but also in terms of
macroeconomic stability. The latter study concluded that inflation and price volatility prove to be
lower when countries keep stabilization funds, and it weakly supported the proposition that
commodity funds could be useful macroeconomic stabilizers. On the whole, the economics
literature suggests that commodity funds will be small when they are motivated by commodity price
fluctuations, since larger funds distort the domestic economy and can trigger suspicions about the
fund's activities in international financial markets (Devlin and Titman 2004).
A separate justification for SWFs is that they permit nations to set aside money derived from
exploiting exhaustible resources today, for future generations. For instance, the first commodity
SWF was the oil fund established by the Kuwait Government in 1953; shortly thereafter the nation

2

See Arrau and Claessens (1992), Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007), and Fasono (2000) for a more detailed discussion on the
necessity of fiscal stabilization funds.
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of Kiribati established a commodity fund in 1956 in order to manage revenues from phosphate
deposits (Petelis 2007; Truman 2007b). More recent examples include the state of Alaska which has
put 2.5 percent of its oil royalties into its Alaska Fund. This practice is thought to improve
intergenerational equity, smoothing the time path of revenues generated by nonrenewable resources
(Olters 2007).
A theoretical grounding for this conclusion is offered by Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) who
use a model of a government-run “trust fund" that pays future generations claims for revenues
generated by the natural resource. They construct a simple pure exchange overlapping generations
(OLG) setup with an exhaustible resource. Exhaustibility is the irreversible degeneration of the
resource, while the resource’s “amenity value” refers to the services provided by exploiting it.
Inasmuch as natural resource extraction today reduces the resource’s amenity value tomorrow, a
regulatory mechanism is required to promote intergenerational equity. Agents maximize lifetime
utility by selecting consumption levels of private and public goods, and aggregate welfare is the
summation of individual lifetime utilities. The model considers three alternative regulatory
scenarios. In a first, there is zero extraction preventing the use of natural resources for all
generations, akin to keeping an oil field idle. The second scenario, termed ‘grandfathering,’ leaves
the ownership of the natural resource to the first generation, while future generations pay to mitigate
pollution. This is equivalent to the distribution of all oil or mineral revenues to the first generation.
The third scenario introduces a trust fund which entitles all generations to an equal claim over the
natural resource. The authors consider the trust fund as an independent institution that can ensure
future generations receive their claims; it is like a saving fund to keep some of the revenues
generated by an exhaustible resource for future generations. A comparison of the three scenarios in
terms of social welfare indicates that grandfathering improves efficiency compared to the zero
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extraction policy, but it favors the first generation over others. By comparison, establishing the trust
fund improves welfare for subsequent generations.
An alternative, though related, model of a SWF fund has been termed a financing fund, built
up when a government has a budget surplus that it wishes to dedicate to investment instead of
current spending. Some argue that this sort of investment pool is more likely to constitute true
“saving,” as compared to a stabilization fund, because the latter tends to be paid for via borrowing
(often implicitly; c.f. Fasono 2000). Of course, such financing funds are often seen as promoting
intergenerational equity and fiscal stability; examples include the Norway Government Pension
Fund-Global (GPFG), the Kuwait General Reserve Fund, and the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund.
Table 2 provides a listing of the major SWFs and their asset holdings, as well as their stated
objectives and sources assembled from a variety of recent sources.
Table 2 here
There is also much interest in what SWFs invest in, a topic of particular salience over the
recent past as key global financial institutions have received massive transfers from important Asian
funds including the Singaporean Government Investment Corporation and the Chinese government
investment fund. One reason these transactions have garnered so much public comment is that
public investment pools have traditionally not revealed much about their holdings or governance
structure. Such nontransparency has been justified on grounds that it preserves investment
flexibility and protects business opportunities, but of course this also means that one cannot obtain
much useful information regarding the majority of SWF funds’ asset allocation patterns.
Furthermore, inasmuch as most SWFs do not acknowledge specific liability profiles, they tend not
to seek to finance any specific time path of benefits or cashflows denominated in domestic
currency.
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Precisely how SWF managers tend to invest their government-managed asset pools is often
very difficult to ascertain. Some information is available for four of the more transparent funds, as
reported in Table 3. Here we see that Norway’s SWF has a 100 percent global portfolio with a
roughly 40-60 split between equities and bonds. New Zealand’s fund holds about half its assets in
international equities; it holds no foreign bonds but has nearly a quarter of its portfolio in “other
investments” which may include domestic real estate. Ireland’s SWF holds nearly 90% of its assets
in international securities, mostly equities. Australia’s very new public investment pool is unique in
holding mainly domestic securities but this is changing as procedures are established for global
diversification.
Table 3 here
Sovereign Pension Funds. The third category of government-controlled asset pools we scrutinize
here consists of the reserves held by government-run public pension funds, where the assets are
earmarked for the payment of current and future retiree benefits. These reserves can be generated
through an intentionally-funded pension scheme or built up as ‘transitional’ reserves generated by
population aging where contributions from a large cohort of workers result in a temporary flow of
funds in excess of current benefits payouts. A number of countries have well-funded national
pension schemes, and several of them have accumulated substantial assets associated in their future
fund accounts. According to Watson Wyatt (2007), public pension funds are 1.7 times as large as
the total estimated size of SWFs around the world. Iglesias and Palacios (2000) document most of
the publicly-mandated pension funds and the amount of assets held by these funds as a percentage
of GDP. Table 4 lists the major sovereign pension funds and their asset holdings.
Table 4 here
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Often what characterizes these pools is that contributions and payouts are linked through
some implicit or explicit contractual arrangement to pay old-age benefits.3 That is, a public pension
fund can provide an opportunity to build up assets to cover future pension liabilities without
changing the inherent tax and benefit structure of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. Conventionally,
a pure PAYG system is seen by many economists to be welfare-reducing, as it tends to decrease an
economy’s capital stock by taxing the young generation with a high propensity to save, to pay
retiree pensions to those with a high propensity to consume (Kumru and Thanopoulos 2007). By
contrast, a funded pension can invest excess contributions for future generations which prove quite
useful in the face of population aging (Abel 2001). It must be acknowledged, of course, that future
funds may reduce negative welfare effects of a pure PAYG system, but they can also increase
intergenerational inequality in a closed economy by benefiting one cohort over another (Lucas,
2001; Oshio 2004; Auerbach and Lee, 2008). In other words, saving excess contributions by means
of a future fund could still be inferior to lowering taxes on younger generations.
Recognizing that public pension funds do exist in many nations, it is of interest to examine
how such funds invest their assets. Some research has deployed actuarial or asset liability
management (ALM) perspectives to link fund assets and liabilities, while others employ a general
equilibrium framework to consider the effects of an investment change on the whole economy. For
instance, MaCurdy and Shoven (2001) adopt an actuarial framework to explore the possible
consequences of an asset reallocation in the U.S. Social Security Trust Fund from bonds to stocks.
In particular, they examine whether selling government bonds and buying corporate stocks would
improve the finances of the old-age system. Based on historical return data, they conclude that such
a reallocation carries significant risk to participants (that is, the relocation might bring a lower
3

A further distinction in these funds relates to the form of payout. Defined benefit (DB) plans promise a payout defined
in terms of salary achieved; defined contribution (DC) arrangements rely on investment performance of accumulated
contributions. See United Nations (2007).
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return than expected). Using a general equilibrium framework, Abel (2001) analyzes the effects of
asset reallocation on the equilibrium equity premium and the equilibrium growth rate of the capital
stock. He concludes that when a national pension fund moves into equities, the expected income of
the trust fund increases but the welfare consequences will depend on the benefit structure of the
social security system.4 Similarly, Bohn (1999; 2002) shows that welfare effects of the asset
reallocation depend largely on the specific pattern of macroeconomic shocks, the risk characteristics
of equities, and individual preferences. In general, it is not assured that intergenerational equity will
result from moving to a funded pension.5
The relationship between publicly managed pension fund performance and governance
structures has been relatively well-documented (Iglesias and Palacios 2000; Carmichael and
Palacios 2003; Mitchell and Useem 2000). There are also several empirical studies analyzing the
investment performance of public pension funds (Mitchell and Hsin 1997; Mitchell and Hustead
2000; Mitchell and Smith 1994; Useem and Mitchell 2000). Yet relatively little has been written on
how one might link public sector pension investments to the specific structure of pension
obligations that the funds face. Table 5 provides a comparison of the asset allocations of four
publicly-held pension funds that do report their data in a public manner. The first two of these, the
Canadian and Swedish plans, are essentially funded add-ons to national social security programs;
this drives their relatively heavy portfolio concentration in foreign equities. The Korean and
Japanese funds, by contrast, represent a demographically-driven temporary accumulation of

4

In a defined-contribution system, the gains from increased pension fund earnings are distributed to retirees. Hence,
young individuals start to save less since they expect higher pension benefits in the future. This, in turn, reduces the
current capital stock and social welfare. In a defined-benefit system, increased pension fund earnings reduce payroll
taxes. In response to increased current income, young individuals increase their savings, and hence, the current capital
stock increases (Abel 2001).
5
Some researchers (Barro 1979) view such a “demographic dividend” as the natural result of optimal tax smoothing.
Yet the timing is critical: because social security taxes are tied to benefits payable far into the future, these tax
collections generate large current financial reserves in the control of the public sector making them potentially at risk
for spending on other purposes.
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contributions held mainly in domestic securities. This latter pattern is consistent with the fact that
these funds’ liabilities are also denominated in domestic currencies though it is unclear whether a
formal portfolio optimization reflecting this aspect of the liability profile has been undertaken. In
the case of Japan, publicly-held pension resources amount to about 30% of GDP, a substantial
amount responsive to the rapid aging of the Japanese population. Yet the fund falls far short of
what is needed to pay future liabilities: KNH system liabilities of 550 trillion yen are several times
larger than the government’s old-age system reserve fund of around 179 trillion yen (Takayama
2006). Also, estimates suggest that the future shortfall might be substantially reduced through
superior investment of these resources. One recent analysis by Lu et al. (2007) suggested that a 1
percentage point increase in returns, from 3% to 4%, might bolster by 11 times the system’s
reserves in the year 2100.
Table 5 here
Public Pension Fund Asset/Liability Considerations. Many analysts who work on private-sector
pensions have concluded that some form of asset-liability joint management works best if one links
investment policy and payout promises (c.f. Blake 2006). It is striking, therefore, that the vast
majority of discussions of SWFs as well as publicly-managed pensions are silent about the need to
link portfolio management goals to any particular obligation stream. One recent study by Maurer et
al. (2008) investigates how a tax-sponsored public pension fund might invest pension contributions
to relieve government budgets taking into account the risk and rewards from capital market
diversification. While the analysis is a case study of a German civil servant pension, the more
general contribution of the work is that it explicitly models the pension fund manager’s appetite for
risk and reward.
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An outcome of that study is that it provides recommendations for portfolio investments
which control the expected economic costs of providing the promised pensions, while at the same
time controlling investment risk. Both the expectation and the Conditional Value-at-Risk of
economic pension costs are simulated using a stochastic simulation process for pension plan assets,
allowing the authors to simultaneously set both the optimal contribution rate and the optimal capital
market allocation. Of key importance is the fact that the plan sponsor may occasionally be forced to
make supplementary contributions, which, as in the real world, brings with it a penalty.
Conversely, the authors also prohibit the public pension from being used as a hedge fund, so excess
assets are withdrawn according to a pre-set rule. In the German case, the authors demonstrate that
the optimal pension fund investment strategy given a 20 percent of salary contribution rate requires
investing the public fund 30 percent equities and 70 percent in bonds.6
Naturally specific portfolio allocations must vary with capital market parameters, but the
general approach is useful in making explicit a public fund manager’s performance objectives when
developing fund investment policies. Furthermore, given the nature of publicly-managed funds,
when managers make their portfolio allocation decisions, the objective function must surely include
intergenerational considerations (Weinberger and Golub 2007).7 Just as in the case of corporate
pensions, this will require developing dynamic multi-period simulation models which take into
account both the risks and returns associated with risky investment including Value-at -Risk
models.8

6

Current taxpayers only have to pay regular contributions of 15 percent but the portfolio is invested 43 percent in
equities. In this way future generations may benefit from contribution holidays and withdrawals, while providing an
acceptable level of risk of supplementary contributions resulting from under-funding. For a related model see Haberman
et al. (2000)
7
In the US of late, the question of how to value public pension liabilities has become quite fraught (Pension Research
Council 2008), particularly regarding whether these should be ‘marked to market’ using risk-free discount rates.
8
In an interesting extension, Gray (2007) proposes that governments should move to using value at risk for all
macroeconomic risks, by building a comprehensive national balance sheet and simulating national assets, liabilities, and
contingent claims.
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Good Management Practice in Public Investment Funds
The literature on what constitutes good management in public investment funds has thus far
focused primarily on public sector pensions rather than publicly-managed asset pools more
generally. One reason is that, until fairly recently, public pensions were the main form of publiclymanaged funds. For instance, Palacios (2002) estimated that such reserves amounted to around
one-quarter of world GDP, mainly held in the US. Another reason is that there is a paucity of data
on sovereign wealth funds, which we will discuss in greater detail below. In any event, we will
argue in this section that many of the same governance principles apply to all forms of publiclymanaged investment pools (Impavido 2005).
Management practice in the public sector context can be described using three sets of
standards initially proposed by the World Bank: Governance, Accountability, and Investment
practices, referred to here as the GAI scores. Of these three components, governance refers to “the
systems and processes by which [an entity] manages its affairs with the objective of maximizing the
welfare of and resolving the conflicts of interest among its stakeholders” (Carmichael and Palacios
2003:7). Accountability refers to the process by which governance outcomes and decisions are
reported and disclosed to stakeholders. For instance, a public pool invested in this way would
provide access to information about funding shortfalls, conduct publicly-reported audits, and
disclose consultancies and contractual arrangements. Investment practices refer to the process of
developing investment profiles that balance risk and return, taking into account liabilities where
these have been made explicit. Naturally in the case of pension reserves, benefit promises constitute
the liability profile as noted above.
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The literature on corporate governance serves as a useful point of departure in framing the
discussion of public fund management, beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and recently
surveyed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Generally speaking, the problem is cast in a principalagent framework where stakeholders must be protected against possible strategic actions by
managers who may act in their own best interest unless they are constrained. Empirical evidence
has demonstrated the key role of good management practices in corporate performance: for
example, Gompers et al. (2003), using a US database of some 1500 firms through the 1990s, shows
that firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher market value, higher profits, and higher sales
growth, as well as lower capital expenditure and fewer corporate acquisitions. In the emerging
market context, Klapper and Love (2004) analyze firm level data across 14 emerging markets and
find that better corporate governance is associated with better operating performance and market
valuation. Importantly in the present context, they also find that governance provisions matter more
in countries having weak legal environments.
In the corporate sector, controls to handle the principal-agent conflict revolve around clarity
of objective, appropriate rules about conflict of interest, clear incentives/accountability for each
player, and disclosure of decisions and performance. By contrast in the public sector, the challenge
is that there is frequently no agreed-on metric by which agents (taxpayers, public sector employees)
can readily measure the long-term performance of the principals acting on their behalf
(policymakers). However if fund manager objectives are clear, corporate-type governance,
accounting, and investment principles can still be applied and will go a long way to providing
adequate information about performance. On the other hand, experience shows that government
involvement in the financial sector is also susceptible to conflicts of interest and therefore, from a
governance perspective, in need of special attention. Such conflicts can arise from the extensive
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participation of government in financial systems through its role as regulator and owner of financial
institutions; as a (non-atomistic) market participant and fiduciary agent; and through direct
interventions in the operations of the market.
Public Pension Plan Management. To illustrate how good management practices apply to
publicly-managed asset pools, Panel A of Table 6 reports a World Bank-developed checklist for
GAI criteria pertinent to public pension managers (Carmichael and Palacios 2003). The governance
questions are designed to avoid undisclosed conflicts of interest, ensure autonomy from political
intervention, secure staff competence, and in general make the criteria comparable with private
sector rules. The accountability scoresheet focuses on information communication, information
credibility, and process transparency. And the investment criteria focus on potential conflict of
interest issues, along with the dilemmas created by market dominance in particular sectors, or
overall in a country. It is also worth nothing that, though this GAI checklist was developed
specifically for public pension funds, it makes no explicit mention of the public plan’s liability
profile.9
Table 6 here
An alternative set of guidelines devised by the OECD (2005, 2006, and 2007) for pension
managers is also summarized in Panel B of Table 6, reorganized here under our three GAI headings
to emphasize the commonalities and differences. Clearly-defined responsibilities for various
members of management, suitability of personnel, and control over conflict of interest, appear on
both lists, while the OECD offers some useful additional performance benchmarks that do not
appear in the World Bank guidelines. One relates to redress, or what happens when promises made
are not kept. A second pertains to “self-investment,” which the OECD sees as contrary to sensible

9

Liabilities are mentioned in the Accountability checklist, in terms of open reporting.
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diversification of investment risk.10 Thirdly, the OECD explicitly recognizes the importance of a
fund’s liability profile in developing investment strategies and fund objectives. In this sense these
guidelines bring together the purpose and conduct of the fund, more in keeping with the advice
offered in the corporate sector. 11
Sovereign Wealth Fund Management Principles. The need for strong public sector governance
in SWFs arises from the same sources that call for strong corporate governance (Carmichael 2002).
Of particular note is recent research by the Peterson Institute (PI) on public fund management which
proposes a “scoreboard” for comparing management practices of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Truman
2008a, b). This approach identifies four categories of SWF management practice focusing on fund
(1) structure, (2) governance, (3) transparency/accountability, and (4) behavior. The structure and
transparency/accountability categories are further divided into subcategories, such that in total, there
is a total of 33 yes/no questions where either a 1 0.50, or 0.75). Using this formulation the author
ranks SWFs across 31 countries. This tally shows that New Zealand’s Superannuation Fund tops the
list followed by Alaska’s Permanent Fund, while at the bottom are the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority and Corporation of U.A.E. and the Qatar Investment Authority of Qatar.
This approach offers a useful way to systematize thinking about this relatively new corpus
of public sector activity (a full list of variables and funds by name appears in Appendix I and II).
To elaborate somewhat on how the scoring works, under the heading structure, the rubric identifies
SWF clarity of objective, source of funding, and investment strategy. Topics addressed cover

10

In the public pension context, “self investment” could be interpreted as purchase of own domestic government bonds.
Whereas many countries do require their public pension reserves to be heavily invested in this asset class, it must be
questioned when, for instance, Japan’s GPIF recently suffered when the investment quality of national government
bonds was downgraded. This may explain recent reports indicating that the Japanese may begin investing some portion
of the nation’s reserves as a soon-to-be created sovereign wealth fund (Lewis 2008; Pesek 2008).
11
Alternatively, SWF outcomes could be developed using the proposed voluntary guidelines for private equity firms
recently drawn up by The Walker Group (Walker 2007). This group, however, seeks to emphasize communication of
decisions and outcomes, rather than to implement decision-making structures or measure suitability of investment
outcomes.
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communication of the fund’s objective, the specification of both sources and uses of funds, whether
there is frequent intervention in source and use (presumably an indicator of multiple or expedient
objectives in fund use), and the fund’s relationship with the broader government budget. Clarity of
investment strategy and separation from international reserves are also considered. From these
elements, the picture that emerges has a “good” SWF being the public investment fund that has long
term objectives other than strictly currency stabilization, explicitly or implicitly linked to some
intertemporal allocation and/or distributional objective. Relating this to the elements of good
management we have already identified, structure in the PI terminology encompasses some
elements of governance along with investment strategy. The question of the fund’s objective, and its
scoring, is subject to caveat. This is because most funds examined in the PI study scored positively
on this, but there was no attempt to link the stated objective with any other practice. Therefore the
tally gives credit to a fund that explicitly lists its objectives, but it does not then additionally credit
funds where other aspects of management practice support the stated objective, nor does it penalize
funds where they do not.
In the PI formulation, the second heading, governance, speaks to the independence of the
fund’s investment strategy and the independence of the role of manager in executing investment
strategy. Also under this rubric indicators for the existence of corporate responsibility and ethical
guidelines are included, as well as indicators of whether the policies are publicly announced and
followed. The notion of governance falls somewhat short of what might be expected given the
corporate governance literature. For instance, there is no inquiry about the role of the governing
board, or about the incentives available to operational roles in the organization.
The third major category proposed in the PI index pertains to how the SWF behaves in terms
of transparency/accountability. Matters considered include reporting on activities and performance,
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public disclosure of investment portfolios, geographic location of direct investments, specific
investments, currency of investments, and the identity of investment agents. The category also
includes information about audits, regularity, public availability, and independence. The final PI
category, behavior, asks about the nature and speed of adjustment of the SWF portfolio, and this is
the least clearly explained. It should be noted that of the 33 PI questions, 14 fall under the
transparency heading, and several of the questions listed under the structure heading could also
plausibly be placed there as well. While this is an important component of overall fund
management, the fact that only five items are included under the governance heading is rather
arbitrary and most likely incomplete.
Below we will use these scoreboard measures as a way to begin to link SWF performance
measures to factors that might drive these outcomes. It must be noted again here that the PI
scoreboard is again silent on the links between management of assets and liabilities, which could be
deleterious to fund performance inasmuch as investment policy is likely to vary depending on the
objectives of the funds. This is generally because most SWFs funds do not explicitly state their
objectives, whereas for public pensions, the benefit streams that consist of the funds’ liabilities can
be (more or less) valued cleanly. Even then, it is often the case that pension system liabilities tend
not to be well-integrated into investment policy.

Do Public Management Practices Affect Performance?
Next we turn to a review of studies seeking to show how public fund management practices
shape key outcomes. Inasmuch as most of the work on management practices focuses on corporate
performance, we begin with an overview of this topic, and then we turn to a discussion of what is
known about management of public sector funds.
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Empirical research tying corporate management practices to firm-level outcomes is
extensive. Much of the research through the mid-1990’s is reviewed by Schleifer and Vishny
(1997); since then, additional studies have emerged in response to the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) requiring US public companies to institute a range of procedural and structural reforms
intended to enhance stakeholder confidence in the post-Enron era. The range of outcomes addressed
in this literature is vast, including the corporation’s return on assets, market valuation, stock returns,
success at making acquisitions, and Tobin’s Q (or the firm’s market value of assets as a proportion
of the replacement value of its assets), among others.12 The measures of ‘good managerial practice’
used by empirical analysts are several, and include most prominently key metrics of corporate
governance. This, per Schliefer and Vishny (1997: 737), refers to the “ways in which suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return.” In particular, the literature
emphasizes how investors may gain power through legal protection (e.g. via protection of minority
rights and limits on managerial self-dealing), and also via large investor blocks which control
managerial behavior directly. Accordingly, the literature has found important relationships between
countries’ legal efficacy scores, which indicate whether an enterprise is founded on common or civil
law, and variables indicative of shareholder control rights. Many studies also examine policies
regarding transparency and accountability, on the argument that rules enhancing financial reporting
are likely to result in better protection for the investor.
The literature on public enterprise management builds on this private sector foundation in
seeking to craft indicators of good-quality management and relate them to successful public firm
outcomes. One problem is that public entities often do not conform to private-sector accounting and

12

For a recent review of the empirical governance literature see Michaud and Magaram (2006); among the most cited
studies are Gompers et al. (2003) and Schliefer and Vishny (1997). There are also numerous examinations of the links
between good management practices and executive compensation which are beyond the scope of the present study; a
recent review includes Gerakos (2007).
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reporting standards, and another is that output measures used in the private sector frequently have
no counterpart in the public sector. Nevertheless analysts have found it natural to use for public
sector entities the same principal-agent framework mentioned above and popularized in the
corporate world. In this context, the taxpayer and other members of the public represent the
principals, while the agents are the government managers guiding the public enterprise (c.f.
Ambachtsheer 2007b; Coronado et al. 2003). Thus in theory it would be feasible to evaluate
whether particular management practices can shape outcomes of public sector enterprises, though
with some adaptations depending on the type of public firm in question.
In the specific case of public entities of key interest here - namely public pension plans and
sovereign wealth funds - the conventional measures of corporate outcomes such as shareholder
wealth, firm profitability, and market share do not readily apply. For this reason, analysts have
turned to other metrics to determine whether public sector enterprise performance is enhanced as a
result of particular management practices. For instance one outcome of interest might be
investment-related. In the simplest case, for instance, public pension funds which hold some assets
can report their target annual return (e.g. 3.2% in the case of the Japanese GPIF). More elaborately
perhaps, some public plan managers may indicate their risk-adjusted returns vis a vis some
benchmark. Relatively few focus on the dynamic path of liabilities as well as assets, about which
we say more below.
The few existing studies linking public pension plan investment strategies and investment
returns tend to show that these are often influenced by governance factors such as board
composition (Mitchell and Hsin 1997). For instance, having more retirees tends to lower
performance due to greater weighting toward a fixed income portfolio. Again in public pensions,
Useem and Mitchell (2000) show that governance variables account for over 20 percent of the
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cross-pension plan variation in investment strategies, which in turn are positively associated with
subsequent investment return performance on the pension fund assets. Yang and Mitchell (2008)
examine how pension plans’ funded status (or the ratio of plan assets to liabilities) and investment
returns respond to measures of pension board composition, management practice, reporting
practice, and investment practice. They show that many pension boards have political appointees as
well as active and/or retired workers on the roster, both of which can be problematic when these
board members may not be particularly financially expert.
Another issue is that sometimes public entity trustees have used fund assets to further their
own (or their party’s) political/social objectives. Hsin and Mitchell (1997) find that several pension
management factors are statistically significant and economically important. For instance, ceteris
paribus, having more plan participants on the pension board, whether retired or active, reduces plan
funding levels and the point estimates imply that adding an additional active member reduced stock
funding by 0.7 percentage points, while adding one more retired member decreases funding by 1.7
percentage points. Further, investment yields on the public pension plan assets appear significantly
lower when retiree representation increases, perhaps due to lack of investment expertise. Enhanced
pension reporting, including making annual reports on financial, actuarial, statistical, and
investment information to stakeholders, can improve returns by 2.1 percentage points annually.
Research on public pensions and mutual funds by Ambachtsheer (2007a, b) uses as the
dependent variable “net value added” or the fund’s gross investment return minus its benchmark
return and the fund’s total expenses. This outcome proves statistically related to a lengthy list of 45
measures of governance quality obtained by interviewing public fund CEOs. Ambachtsheer (2005:
196-7) reports that of the entire lengthy list of indicators, six governance-related and five
management-related measures in his CEO survey are significant. In that author’s words,
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“statistically significant governance statements (are)…related mainly to effective fiduciary behavior
and selection processes, clarity in delegation of authority, and a high level of trust between the
governing and managing fiduciaries. The statistically significant management statements (are)
related mainly to clear strategic positioning and to the effective development and execution of the
fund’s strategic plan.”
How Can Fund Objectives Be Incorporated? The studies of public funds mentioned above focus
primarily on asset-related outcomes such as returns and funding patterns.13 Yet as we have argued
above, one should also consider integrating the asset/investment management effort with the
evolution of plan liabilities. For instance, in the case of a public pension system, the goal is
generally agreed to ensure that retiree benefits can be paid without large and unexpected increases
in the cost of maintaining the solvency of the system. Nevertheless, as Ambachtsheer (2005:198)
emphasizes, “fund managers of late have made no measurable effort to take into account the
financial characteristics of their liabilities when structuring their fund policy portfolios.” Indeed, a
reason that managers may have found it difficult to do so is that it may be troublesome to convert
the broad objective of “paying pension benefits” into specific fund management rules and
performance criteria. Sometimes the liability path will be difficult to model and simulate. Or public
pension plan investment policy may be set independently of liability paths on purpose; for instance
this is the case for the US Social Security Trust Fund which is permitted to hold only special issue
government bonds.14 Still an additional reason that asset-liability management is not undertaken in a
concerted, coherent form may be because policymakers may not wish to make explicit what their
risk appetite is in terms of shortfalls and surpluses.

13

Insofar as we are aware, there are very few studies that report investment performance for the SWFs that are not
pension related, much less risk adjusted or benchmark-linked returns. One of the view reporting public pension returns
by country and time period is that of Carmichael and Palacios (2002).
14
For a discussion of investment practices of 15 other publicly-managed pension fund systems see UN (2007).
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Nevertheless, in the last several decades, great strides have been made in analysts’ ability to
model and solve for ways to implement asset-liability models, and this could be even more useful in
the future. Of course, to select an appropriate investment strategy in the face of these stochastic
liability patterns, policymakers must make explicit their risk budgets, or how they balance the
unavoidable and dynamic tensions between investment returns, benefit payments, and contribution
requirements. Such risk budgets must take into account both the uncertainty of system revenues,
including investment returns earned on pension fund assets, and stochastic pension liabilities as
discussed above. Recent discussion on these points includes including Moore (2007) and Boender et
al. (2001), the latter of whom implement this approach for Dutch pension funds. Maurer et al.
(2007) examine public sector employee pensions in Germany. In general, these evaluations must
specify how plan outlays will depend on projections of earnings, patterns of labor market
attachment, retirement trends, longevity forecasts, and many other factors.15 In turn, investment
portfolios can be optimized to take liability variations into the decision of how to structure the asset
mix given capital market trends. Other examples of asset-liability management in the public pension
fund arena include the work of Bogentoft et al. (2001) and several of the excellent papers in Ziemba
and Mulvey (2001).
One of the most clearly exposited papers in this vein is by Merton (2001), who implements
this approach in the case of a university endowment fund. His model is relevant to the present
research as it recognizes that such entities draw not only on their endowment pools but may also
count on other cash flows including contributions from donors, tuition and other business income,
and grants. He makes the crucial point that these revenue flows are also volatile and so should be

15

Other examples of this in the US include efforts by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2004) to build a stochastic
model to evaluate the impacts of possible changes in the national old-age benefits program. The US Social Security
Administration (US SSA 2008) has also developed a stochastic model used to project probability distributions for future
outcomes of the system’s financial status.
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modeled as part of the plan’s resources. This approach has a logical parallel in the case of public
pension funds and SWFs which may receive contributions from a variety of sources, while they can
also draw down their investment pools to meet specific obligations. Insofar as some of the
contribution sources have the same risk characteristics as equities, for instance, the entity may
decide to invest less in stock. In its simplest form, the Board’s preference structure for the
university is taken to be a lifetime utility function of the form:
∞
MaxE0 ⎡ ∫ (Q1 ,...Qm , t )dt ⎤
⎢⎣ 0
⎥⎦

(1)

where Qj(t) is the quantity of the preferred activity j (e.g. education, research, etc) in which the firm
engages at time t, and the utility function is well behaved. The entity is assumed to be indefinitely
lived, making the upper limit on the integral infinity. (Other more complex formulations can be
permitted). The remainder of the model specifies cost functions for producing the firm’s outputs,
and dynamics for cash flows for contributions and investment earnings. Over time the university
selects a vector of activities Q, and a portfolio allocation in its endowment fund, to achieve
maximum utility (1). Similarly, a pension fund can also be modeled as seeking to pay benefits,
subject to constraints over revenue, investment patterns, and perhaps some risk aversion regarding
extreme cash shortfalls that would otherwise require massive transfusions of new cash. To the
extent that a university (in Merton’s case) or a pension fund (in our case) faces different risk
profiles for its revenue streams and different cost profiles, this will produce different optimal
investment strategies for the endowment pools.
The important lesson that emerges from these analyses is that good management practice has
a material positive impact on corporate performance, but this cannot yet be shown for publicly-
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managed funds in view of the dearth of data on this topic.16 Furthermore, most studies of public
fund management have emphasized only financial or actuarial outcomes such as net returns,
funding, or investment expenses. Only a handful have constructed clearly-formulated models that
link fund contributions and investments to measures of anticipated future benefits that these funds
seek to deliver. So the challenge is to “determine a jointly optimal dynamic strategy for the asset
and liability instruments which balances the interests and requirements of all agents involved”
(Boender et al. 2001:564). In particular, public fund managers must take into account the ability of
the fund to meet other objectives (e.g. not raising taxes too sharply on any given generation in the
event of a revenue shortfall).

Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Public Investment Fund Management
Next we turn to an empirical examination of key factors associated with variation in
observed SWF management attributes. We focus on the measures of governance, accountability,
and investment (GAI) described above and explore what might influence how these asset pools
function along these dimensions. A first implementation step requires us to group the multiplicity of
scores reported on SWFs in the PI scoreboard into our three preferred groupings. We do so by
computing the G, A, and I scores by summing the subcomponents for each of the SWFs, and then
we add these to form the aggregate composite index.17 Next, we link these GAI indicators using

16

In Ambachtsheer’s (2005) words, the research is suggestive of “a noteworthy convergence between what are deemed
to be generally good governance and management practices in the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors as a whole and
what we now find is important in the governance and management of pension funds.”
17
Appendix I and II indicate how we reallocate the PI scoreboard items into our three GAI categories. Accountability is
quantitatively the most important of the three components, comprising 15 of the 33 questions on the PI list. We omit the
PI indicator of whether a SWF is integrated within the overall government budget. In analysis not reported here in
detail, we conducted principal components analysis on the entire vector of underlying scores to determine whether any
subset of factors is particularly useful in summarizing larger set of analysis. However this exercise does not return a few
key factors that explain most of the variability, so we use GAI and its subcomponents as our independent variables. Not
surprisingly, Appendix IV shows that the governance, accountability, and investment measures of fund success are
strongly positively correlated.
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multivariate regression models to key factors descriptive of the national environments in which
these publicly managed funds are found, following the empirical strategy outlined in the corporate
governance literature described above. Our particular focus is on indicators of country-specific
governance and political participation, human capital and the business environment, and
demographic controls to be described in more detail below. We report OLS regression coefficients
for both the aggregate GAI scores as well as the three subcategories; the following framework is
common to both:
GAI score = f (National governance and political participation indicators; Indicators
of human capital and business environment; Demographic controls).
The national governance and political participation variables we use in this formulation are
derived from the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI; see Kauffman et al. 2007) which
include six factors relating to different aspects of governance: Voice and Accountability; Political
Stability; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.
Country-specific measures of the quality of human capital and the efficacy of the business
environment are taken from World Economic Forum indices of global competitiveness (GCI; see
Sala-i-Martin et al. 2007). The GCI indicators focus on economic performance including
macroeconomic stability, as well as education and business sophistication. To render the many
World Bank and GCI indices more tractable, we use Principal Component Analysis (Hamilton
2006) to combine them into a Modified World Bank Governance Index (MWBGI) and Modified
Global Competitive Index (MGCI). In some cases, we substitute some of the underlying factors
indicative of the political environment instead of using the overall indexes; these include “Voice
and Accountability” measuring participation in government and freedom of expression, and
“Government Effectiveness” which measures civil service quality. The rationale is that freedom of
expression should enhance all dimensions of our GAI score, because of the greater risk of public
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exposure for incompetence or fraud. Similarly, high quality public service should be able to deliver
better public sector management. Market efficiency can be proxied by a business sophistication
metric, on the grounds that this would be positively associated with public investment fund
accountability. A nation’s legal environment can be represented by regulatory quality (by which we
mean policies that enhance private sector performance) or rule of law (by which we mean a strong
judicial system), following Klapper and Love (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who show that
better legal systems help protect shareholder rights.
To this fairly conventional list of control variables we add a measure of the old-age
dependency ratio, to test whether the performance indicators are related to intertemporal objectives
even if these are implied rather than objective. In a few cases, some countries had multiple SWFs
with differing GAI scores. To handle this, we compute an asset-weighted average of the GAI
scores to come up with a single combined fund metric for that country. Also a few small countries
had exceptionally high GAI scores along with very low GCI and Governance scores.18 Inasmuch as
these developing/emerging market funds could be powerfully influenced by international
organizations’ view of good fund management practice, we control on the log of SWF assets to
reflect this diversity. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics on our empirical variables are
reported in Appendix III.
The multivariate coefficient estimates for the overall GAI aggregate score appear in Table 7.
As there are only 26 SWFs for which full data are available, we are parsimonious in selecting which
explanatory variables to include. We see that larger funds tend to score lower on the GAI ranking
when statistically significant. We also see that better governance is associated with a higher old-age
dependency ratio in columns 1-3, suggesting that when the elderly grow relatively more numerous,
their voice tends to be reflected in larger economic claims driving better SWF management.
18

This list includes Azerbaijan, Botswana, Timor Leste and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Curiously, however, only the current dependency ratio is statistically significant, while projected
old-age ratios tend not to be.
Turning next to the governance and economic variables, Column 1 indicates that the World
Bank governance index is positive and significant at only the 10% level, while the GCI index is not
significant and negative. Columns 2-4 further explore the relationship between relevant national
characteristics and the GAI scores, where we see not much statistical association between good
SWF governance and business sophistication, regulatory quality, and rule of law. Only the Voice
and Accountability factor is positively associated with good fund governance.
Table 7 here
Our results thus differ from one recent study on private pension funds by Servaes and
Khorana (2007), who argue that more efficient mutual funds are found in countries with betterfunctioning judicial systems and more educated populations. Overall, based on current data, we find
little evidence that national characteristics strongly shape the governance, accountability, and
investment structures of national sovereign wealth funds.

Conclusions
This paper has examined management practices for publicly-managed asset pools, seeking
to draw lessons about how these institutions might better manage their funds. Our review of the
main types of public investment pools having a long-term objective suggests that pension fund and
SWFs share many commonalities with regard to their objectives and rationales. Building on prior
studies, we devise criteria regarding fund governance, accountability, and investment policies. Yet
empirical evidence on these outcomes for publicly-managed asset pools is scarce, and what there is
tends to be silent on the structure of liabilities implicitly or explicitly associated with these funds.
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We relate the available GAI measures for sovereign wealth funds to a range of national governance
and political participation indicators, measures of human capital and business environment, and
demographic controls, and we find that the current aged dependency ratio appears to be a very
important explanatory factor associated with good management. This suggests that nations subject
to the most pressure from population ageing tend to be more careful with SWF governance.
Better understanding of what constitutes best practice for the management of the substantial
global reserves held in SWFs and public pensions would surely be beneficial for policy formulation.
Of most value toward this end would be information linking performance indicators to fund
objectives, presumably including a careful depiction of intertemporal and intergenerational
objectives. Yet as SWFs have grown, they appear to be demonstrating an increasing risk appetite,
very little transparency, and virtually no clarity of objectives. As a result, their growth is spurring
debate in both recipient countries and among financial market intermediaries, along with calls for
regulatory reform in the international sphere and a move toward financial protectionism or even the
explicit prohibition of SWF investments. For instance, the European Commission is drafting a plan
to prohibit non-European Union members from investing in the European energy business. German
Chancellor Angela Merkel has mentioned designing a system similar to that implemented in the US
where a governmental Committee on Foreign Investment must review and approve foreign-based
investments that might be deemed a threat to national security (EurActive.com 2007). Such
financial protectionism might be avoided if these publicly-managed investment pools were made
more transparent, clearer in their objectives, and more accountable to the many stakeholders in
these funds.
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Table 1. List of Currency Stabilization Funds by Nationality and Size

Country
Algeria
Australia
Brazil
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Libya
Malaysia
Mexico
Norway
Poland
Russia
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
UK
US

Assets (US$M' 2007)
83,000
67,166
155,617
1,334,590
136,267
220,223
49,406
907,346
250,667
64,000
91,240
78,172
56,658
52,286
407,495
144,056
266,287
69,000
67,000
42,000
55,086

Assets as % of GDP
63.1
7.4
11.8
41.1
65.9
20.0
11.4
20.7
26.2
112.2
48.9
8.8
14.5
12.4
31.6
89.3
69.5
28.1
10.1
1.5
0.4

Sources: Merrill Lynch (2007), Truman (2007a, b), and World Bank (2008).
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Table 2. Sovereign Wealth Funds by Name, Year of Inception, Source, Stated Objective, and Size
Country

Fund Name

Year of
Inception

Sources

Objectives

Assets
(USM$'2007)

Assets
as % of
GDP

UAE

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Council

1976

Oil revenues

Savings

875,000

454.3

Singapore

Government of Singapore Investment Corporation

1981

Trade surpluses

Savings

330,000

204.5

Singapore

Temasek Holding

1974

Fiscal surpluses

110,000

68.2

Norway

Government Pension Fund - Global

1990

Oil revenues

Savings
Savings &
stabilization

375,000

95.8

China

State Foreign Exchange Investment Corporation

2007

Trade surpluses

Savings

200,000

6.2

China

Central Hujin Investment Corporation

2003

Trade surpluses

100,000

3.1

Kuwait

Kuwait Investment Authority

1953

Oil revenues

Savings
Savings &
stabilization

213,000

191.3

Russia

Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation

2003

Oil revenues

Stabilization

128,000

9.9

Russia
U.S.
U.S.

Future Generation Fund of the Russian Federation
Alaska Permanent Reserve Fund Co.
New Mexico State Investment Office Trust Funds

2008
1976
1958

Oil revenues
Oil revenues
Royalties on State lands

Savings
Savings
Savings

32,000
37,000
5,000

2.5
0.3
0.04

U.S.

Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund

1974

Mineral revenues

Savings

4,000

0.03

Australia

Future Fund
Brunei Investment Authority General Reserve
Fund

2006

Fiscal surpluses

Savings

53,000

5.8

1983

Oil revenues

Savings

35,000

282.6

Brunei

Ireland
National Pension Reserve Fund
2001
Fiscal surpluses
Savings
31,000
New
Zealand
Superannuation Fund
2001
Fiscal surpluses
Savings
10,000
Total
2,538,000
Sources: Das (2007), Kern (2007), Truman (2008a, b), Watson Wyatt (2007), Ireland National Pension Reserve (2006), and World Bank (2008).

12.0
7.8
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Table 3. Reported Asset Allocation and Return for Four Sovereign Wealth Funds
Fund Name

Country

Reported Asset Allocation (%)
Domestic Fixed
Income

Government Pension Fund - Global
(GPF-G)
New Zealand Superannuation Fund
(NZSF)
National Pension Reserve Fund
(NPRF)
Future Fund

Norway
New Zealand
Ireland
Australia

Return
(%)

Domestic
Equities

Foreign Fixed
Income

Foreign
Equities

Other
Investments

0

0

59.4

40.6

0

7.9

17.3

7.3

0

52.6

22.8

14.6

0
74

0
3.5

12.6
0

76
3.9

11.4
18.6

12.4
7.39

Sources: Australia Future Fund (2008), Norges Bank Investment Management (2006), New Zealand Superannuation Fund (2008), and Ireland National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission (2006).
Notes:
1. In Norway, the GPF-G invests only in global markets. The other wealth fund of the Norwegian government GPF-Norway invests only in local markets. The
table reports the nominal return from the whole portfolio in 2006. The portfolio real return (adjusted for inflation) in 2006 was 5.65%. Nominal returns from
equities and fixed income instruments in 2006 were 17.04% and 1.93% respectively. The annualized nominal return from the portfolio between 1997 and 2006
was 6.49%. The actual asset allocation refers to the situation at the end of 2006.
2. In New Zealand, the NZSF annual reports do not separately report the portfolio share of domestic and foreign fixed income securities, and hence, the
portfolio share of domestic bonds (both in benchmark and actual assert allocation cases) includes the portfolio share of the foreign bonds. The remainder of the
NZSF portfolio is held in other asset classes such as local and global property, commodities, and private markets. The table reports the nominal return (adjusted
for fees but not for inflation) between June 2006 and June 2007. The annualized nominal return from the whole portfolio was 14.81% between 2003 and 2007.
The actual asset allocation refers to end June 2006.
3. In Ireland, the NPRF does not hold Irish government bonds. The portfolio is heavy in alternative asset classes such as property and commodity investments.
Foreign bonds consist of only Eurozone bonds and Eurozone equities (including Irish equities); the latter total about 45% of the portfolio. Since Ireland is a
member of the European Union, one might consider Eurozone bonds and equities as domestic for Ireland. The table presents the 2006 nominal rate of return;
annualized it was 6.5%. The asset allocation refers to end 2006.
4. Australia's Future Fund investment program started in June 2007; the benchmark portfolio has not yet been declared and to date the majority of the portfolio
has been kept in cash (the table reports the portfolio share of the cash in the cell of domestic fixed income securities) and Telstra shares (this is an Australian
telecommunication company). The portfolio share of Telstra Corporation, which is 18.6%, is not reported in the table. The nominal return from the portfolio
from June 2006 to June 2007 is reported in the table. The real return (the nominal return after the price inflation adjustment) is 5.29 in the same period. Actual
asset allocation is as of June 2007.
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Table 4. Publicly-Managed Pension Asset Pools by Size
Inception
year

Assets
(US$M’ 2006)

Assets as
% of GDP

U.S.

1940

2,048,112

15.5

Government Pension Investment

Japan

2001

935,569

21.6

3

National Pension Fund

1988

190,842

21.5

4

GEPF

Korea
South
Africa

n.d.

177,559

69.6

5

Taiwan

n.d.

128,194

18.8

Sweden

2000

117,468

30.5

7

Postal Savings Fund
National Pension Funds (AP1, AP2, AP3,
AP4, AP6)
National Social Security Fund and Social
Insurance Funds

2001/1951

104,350

3.9

8

Canada Pension Plan

Canada

1997

86,392

6.9

9

Employees Provident Fund

Malaysia

1991

82,256

55.2

10

Central Provident Fund

Singapore

1955

70,468

53.3

11

Fondo de Reserva de la Seguridad Social

Spain

1997

44,875

3.7

12

Public Institute/Social Security

Kuwait

1977

40,482

50.1

13

Fond de Reserve des Retraites

France

2000

39,140

1.8

14

Employees Provident Fund

India

1952

31,581

3.5

15

The State Pension Fund

Finland

1990

12,929

6.2

16

Social Security Fund

1990

9,074

4.4

17

General Organization for Social Insurance

Thailand
Saudi
Arabia

1973

8,622

2.8

18

Social Security Financial Stabilization Fund

Portugal

1989

8,330

4.3

19

IMSS Reserve

Mexico

n.d.

7,392

0.9

20

Social Security Corporation

Jordan

1980

6,023

42.5

21

Employees' Old-Age Benefits

Pakistan

1976

1,822

1.4

22

Demographic Reserve Fund

Poland

n.d.

1,760

0.5

23

Social Security Fund

Denmark

1964

659

0.2

Rank

Fund Name

Country

1

Social Security Trust Fund

2

6

China

Total
4,153,899
Sources: OECD (2007), Canada Pension Plan Board (2008), Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2006), World Bank (2008), India
Employees’ Provident Fund Organization (2008), Singapore Central Provident Fund (2008), Malaysia Employees’
Provident Fund (2008), and Kuwait International Social Security Review (1998).
Note: n.d. = no date
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Table 5. Reported Asset Allocation and Return for Four Publicly-Managed Pension Funds
Fund Name
Country
Asset Allocation in the Actual Portfolio (%)

Canada Pension Plan Investment Board
(CPPIB)
First National Pension Fund (AP1)
National Pension Fund (NPF)
Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF)

Domestic
Fixed
Income

Domestic
Equities

Foreign
Fixed
Income

Foreign
Equities

Canada

24.6

25.2

0

40

Sweden
Korea
Japan

10.6
79.3
48.4

13
12.1
26.3

21
7.3
10.4

44.4
0.4
14.9

Return (%)

Other
Investments

12.9
0
11
0.9
0

9.8
5.39
14.3

Sources: Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (2008); Sweden First AP Fund (2008); Korea National Pension Fund (2008); Japan Government Pension
Investment Fund (2008).
Notes:
1. For Canada, the table shows the nominal rate of return at the end of fiscal 2007. The annualized nominal rate of return between 2004 and 2007 was 13.6%.
The actual asset allocation refers to the situation in 2007.
2. For Sweden, the table shows nominal returns in 2006. The annualized nominal return between 2001 and 2006 was 5.3%. The actual asset allocation refers to
2006. The asset holdings of the other AP funds (AP2, AP3, and AP4) are pretty much same as those of AP1. Fund AP6 is very small and invests only small and
medium Swedish companies; it is excluded from the table.
3. For Korea, the benchmark portfolio was not available; the table shows nominal returns in 2005. The annualized nominal return between 2003 and 2005 was
7.27. The actual asset allocation refers to 2005.
4. For Japan, the table indicates nominal returns in 2005. The annualized nominal return between 2001 and 2005 was 4.1. Actual asset allocation refers to 2007.
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Table 6. International Guidelines for Public Pension Fund Management
Panel A: World Bank Checklist

Panel B: OECD Checklist

GOVERNANCE
Are the roles of the respective parties in the public pension scheme clear?
Are the terms under which the managing agency and its governing members appointed and terminated well
understood?
Are there adequate fit and proper person protections to prevent the agency from being deliberately manipulated
by the government or the Board of the agency?
Is the management agency open and transparent about its governance structures?
Is the scheme open to periodic review; do the government and/or the managing agency welcome constructive
criticism?
How well does the agency’s internal and/or external governance systems compare with those imposed by the
regulator of private pensions?
ACCOUNTABILITY
Does the public have access to adequate information about the governance structures of the public pensions
scheme and its managing agency, either through explicit laws, annual reports, publications and/or web sites?
Is disclosure of potential conflicts of interest of Board members required and imposed?
Is the scheme subject to regular independent audit for both governance and performance?
Are the financial performance and financial state of the scheme revealed publicly on a regular basis based on
sound accounting standards?
Is the scheme’s financial performance reported against established benchmarks?

GOVERNANCE
Identification of responsibilities; Governing
body; Expert advice; Custodian; Suitability;
Redress; Self-investment.

ACCOUNTABILITY
Auditor; Actuary; Accountability; Internal
controls; Reporting; Disclosure; Rigorous
process for investment; Publicly available
investment policy; Identification of
investors; Procedures for investment policy
review; Transparent and market based
valuation and accounting.

Is the government open about its liabilities under the scheme and subject to independent actuarial reviews?
Are the incentive structures within the scheme transparent to the public, linked to delegated responsibilities and
risk based?
INVESTMENT
Is the investment policy fully documented and publicly available?
Is the stated purpose of the scheme to benefit the members of the scheme and, if not, are there potential conflicts
between stated objectives?
Does the policy permit lending to government and/or members and, if so, are there transparent guidelines
identifying the issues involved and governing how such investments will take place?
Is the target rate of return based on a long-term funding ratio objective and is it consistent with this objective?
Does the investment policy identify how it will deal with actual or potential market dominance?
Have all major risks been identified and taken into consideration in forming the investment policy? Has the
tolerable level of risk been defined by the Board.
Are the processes involved in delegating the implementation of the investment policy to managers clearly
defined? Are benchmark criteria for hiring and firing managers clear and the information needed by the Board to
act on them available?
Are the investment parameters defined in terms of restrictions and prohibitions or in terms of modern portfolio
concepts?
Source: Carmichael and Palacios (2003).

INVESTMENT
Retirement income objective and prudential
principles; Prudent person standard;
Fiduciary duty; Clear investment objectives
(liabilities); Strategic asset allocation; Risk
management; Investment options; Portfolio
limits; International investment; Regular
assessment of limits and controls.

Source: OECD (2005).
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Table 7. Empirical Estimates of Aggregate GAI Scores

Log assets
Current old-age dependency ratio
Future old-age dependency ratio
MWBI
MGCI
Business sophistication
Regulatory quality
Voice and accountability
Rule of law
Government effectiveness
R-squared
N

1
-1.61 **
0.96 **

2
-1.34
0.78 **

3
-1.25
0.77 **

4
-2.41 **
0.16

1.62 *
-0.75
-0.76
0.74
2.49

0.68
26

0.68
26

-0.37

-0.54

2.92 *

0.68
26

0.69
3.45
0.41
26

Note:* significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level. For data sources see Appendix I and II,
and for variable definitions see Appendix III.
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Figure 1. Relative Size of Global Asset Pools
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Appendix I: Governance, Accountability, and Investment (GAI) Scores
Country

Fund

Governance

Accountability

Investment

Total

SWFs
Algeria

Revenue Regulation Fund

1

4

4

9

Australia

Future Fund

4

11

10.5

25.5

Azerbaijan

State Oil Fund

4

12

8.5

24.5
17

Botswana

Pula Fund

3

7

7

Brunei

Brunei Investment Agency

1

4

1

6

Canada (Alberta)

Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund

3.5

11.5

8.5

23.5

Chile

Economic and Social Stabilization Fund

3.5

12.5

6

22

China

Central Huijin Investment Company

1

4

4.5

9.5

Hong Kong

Exchange Fund

2

11

8

21

Iran

Oil Stabilization Fund

1

5

1.5

7.5

Ireland

National Pension Reserve Fund

27.5

Kazakhstan

National Oil Fund

Kiribati

5

14

8.5

3.5

9

7.5

20

Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund

1

4

3.5

8.5

Korea

Korea Investment Corporation

3

5.75

7

15.75

Kuwait

Kuwait Investment Authority

Malaysia

Khazanah Nasional

Mexico

4

5.25

5.5

14.75

1.5

8

3

12.5

Oil Income Stabilization Fund

2

7.5

5

14.5

New Zealand

Superannuation Fund

5

15

10.5

30.5

Nigeria

Excess Crude Account

0

5

3.5

8.5

Norway

Government Pension Fund - Global

4.5

15

10

29.5

Oman

State General Reserve Fund

2

3.5

0.5

6

Qatar

Qatar Investment Authority

1

1.25

0.75

3

Russia

Stabilization Fund

1

8.5

6.25

15.75

Sao Tome and Principe

National Oil Account

4

6

5

15

Singapore

Government of Singapore Investment Corporation

3

5.5

4

12.5

Singapore

Temasek Holdings

3

9.5

2.5

15

Sudan

Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund

1.5

4

0

5.5

Timor-Leste

Petroleum Fund

3

14

8.5

25.5

Trinand&Tobago

Heritage and Stabilization Fund

4

8

4.5

16.5

UAE (Abu Dhabi)

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Council

1

0.75

1.25

3

UAE (Abu Dhabi)

Mubadala Development Company

1

1.5

2.5

5

UAE (Dubai)

Istithmar World

1

2.5

1

4.5

US (Alaska)

Alaska Permanent Fund

4

15

11

30

US (New Mexico)

Severance Tax Permanent Fund

3.5

12

12

27.5

US (Wyoming)

Permanent Mineral Trust Fund

5

12

12

29

Venezuela

Macro Stabilization Fund

1

4.5

2

7.5

Venezuela

National Development Fund

1

4.75

1

6.75

2.5

7.7

5.4

15.6

Average
Sources: Truman (2008a, b) and authors' calculations; see Appendix II.
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Appendix II. Criteria for Sovereign Wealth Fund Management Practices
Governance (G)
Are the guidelines for fiscal treatment generally followed without frequent adjustment? (Structure)
Is the SWF separate from the country's international reserves? (Structure)
Does the SWF ethical guidelines that it follows? (Governance)
Is the audit independent? (Transparency and Accountability)
Are decisions on specific investments made by the managers? (Governance)
Accountability (A)
Is the SWF's objective clearly communicated? (Structure)
Is the source of the SWF's funding clearly specified? (Structure)
Is nature of the subsequent use of the principal and earnings in the fund clearly stated? (Structure)
Does the SWF have in place and publicly available guidelines for corporate responsibility that it follows? (Governance)
Does the SWF provide at least an report on its activities and results? (Transparency and Accountability)
Does the SWF provide quarterly report on its activities? (Transparency and Accountability)
Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include the size of the fund? (Transparency and Accountability)
Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on the return it earns? (Transparency and Accountability)
Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on the types of investments? (Transparency and Accountability)
Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on the geographic location of investments? (Transparency and Accountability)
Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on the specific investments? (Transparency and Accountability)
Do regular reports on the investments by the SWF include information on the currency composition of investments? (Transparency and Accountability)
Are the holders of investment mandates identified? (Transparency and Accountability)
Is the SWF subjected to a regular audit? (Transparency and Accountability)
Is the audit published? (Transparency and Accountability)
Investment (I)
Is the overall investment strategy clearly communicated? (Structure)
Is the procedure for the changing the structure clear? (Structure)
Is the role of the government in the setting the investment strategy of the SWF clearly established? (Governance)
Is the role of the manager in executing the investment strategy clearly established? (Governance)
Does the SWF indicate the nature and speed of adjustment in its portfolio? (Behaviour)
Does the strategy use benchmarks? (Transparency and Accountability)
Does the strategy limit investments based on credit ratings? (Transparency and Accountability)
Does the SWF have limits on the size of its stakes? (Behaviour)
Does the SWF not take controlling stakes? (Behaviour)
Does the SWF have a policy on the use of leverage? (Behaviour)
Does the SWF have a policy on the use of derivatives? (Behaviour)
Are derivatives used primarily for hedging?
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Notes: Authors' re-classification of Truman's (2008a, b) PI scores for SWF structure, governance, transparency and accountability, and behaviour variables into our measures of governance, accountability, and
transparency. The PI scoreboard question is shown in italics.
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Appendix III. Variable Definitions and Sources for Empirical Analysis of Public Fund Management Practices
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Total

Sum of Governance, Accountability, and Investment scores.

16.80

8.49

2.25

29.94

Governance

Measures how well a SWF is governed.

2.64

1.37

0.00

5.00

Accountability

Measures degree of accountability.

8.13

4.38

0.20

15.00

Investment

Measures how well the SWF investment activities are structured.

6.03

3.25

0.50

11.20

Log Asset

Log of assets held by the sovereign wealth fund.

3.46

1.67

0.69

6.80

Current old-age
dependency ratio

Ratio of population age 65+ to population age 15-64 (in 2005).

10.96

6.10

1.00

22.00

UN (2008)

Future old-age
dependency ratio
in 2040.

Ratio of population age 65+ to population age 15-64 (in 2040).

28.50

13.88

7.00

59.00

UN (2008)

Modified World
Bank
Governance
Index (WBGI)

Measure of good national governance practices with indicators of voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law, and control of corruption. Principal components analysis is used to generate dataweighted aggregate score of national governance practices.

-0.22

2.31

-3.99

3.02

Kaufmann et al..
(2007) & authors'
calculations.

Modified Global
Competitiveness
Index (GCI)

Measure of economic competitiveness: index of national competitiveness derived by
measures of quality of institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomy, higher education/
training, goods market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological
readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. Principal components
analysis is used to generate data-weighted aggregate measure of competitiveness.

-0.33

2.91

-6.49

4.08

Martin et al.. (2007)
& authors'
calculations.

Business
sophistication

Measures quality of a country's overall business networks and firms' operations and
strategies; higher scores indicate more business sophistication.

4.41

0.75

2.78

5.60

Martin et al. (2007).

Regulatory
quality

Measures government’s ability to generate/implement policies that benefit the private
sector.

0.49

1.06

-1.47

1.95

Kaufmann et al.
(2007)

Voice and
accountability

Measures citizenry's participation in selecting government; freedom of expression;
freedom of association; and free media

0.07

0.99

-1.66

1.64

Kaufmann et al.
(2007).

Rule of law

Measures quality of judicial system.

0.47

1.14

-1.39

2.02

Kaufmann et al.
(2007).

Government
effectiveness

Measures quality of public and civil services; independence of public and civil services
from political pressures; quality of policy formulation and implementation; and
government credibility.

0.60

1.05

-0.96

2.20

Kaufmann et al.
(2007).

Variable

Definition

Source: As indicated and authors' calculations; see text.

Data source
Truman (2008a) &
authors' calculations
Truman (2008a) &
authors' calculations
Truman (2008a) &
authors' calculations
Truman (2008a) &
authors' calculations
Truman (2008a) &
authors' calculations
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Appendix IV. Correlation Matrix for Empirical Variables
1. GAI
2. G
3. A
4. I
5. Log Fund Assets
6. Current old-age dependency ratio
7. Future old-age dependency ratio
8. MWBI
9. MGCI
10. Business sophistication
11. Regulatory quality
12. Voice and accountability
13. Rule of law
14. Government effectiveness

1
1.00
0.81
0.97
0.96
-0.22
0.72
0.34
0.47
0.38
0.31
0.41
0.69
0.42
0.46

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1.00
0.73
0.73
-0.19
0.46
0.33
0.53
0.38
0.34
0.46
0.65
0.50
0.45

1.00
0.89
-0.26
0.70
0.29
0.43
0.34
0.28
0.41
0.64
0.37
0.45

1.00
-0.14
0.76
0.36
0.42
0.38
0.29
0.34
0.65
0.39
0.40

1.00
0.11
0.36
0.31
0.46
0.43
0.29
-0.07
0.37
0.34

1.00
0.70
0.50
0.59
0.47
0.44
0.63
0.46
0.52

1.00
0.55
0.74
0.67
0.48
0.45
0.56
0.54

1.00
0.85
0.76
0.93
0.81
0.98
0.97

1.00
0.96
0.78
0.64
0.89
0.83

1.00
0.71
0.56
0.81
0.73

1.00
0.68
0.88
0.95

1.00
0.76
0.75

1.00
0.93

Source: Authors' calculations; see text and Appendix III.

